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The literature on international trade in relation to development --
even where it has been empirical rather than theoretical - has
concentrated on the relationship between exports and growth of
GNP, savings gaps and investment ratios, in accordance with the main
parameters of the neo-classical growth model. The result has been to
discover significant correlations between export growth and GNP
growth and its neo-classical parameters, although this leaves open the
question of which way the chain of causal relationship runs and also
whether both export performance and rapid GNP growth are due to
third factors rather than the result of a direct relationship. By
contrast, little has been done to analyse export development system-
atically in relation to parameters which have come to the fore,
perhaps particularly in the work of the IDS, for a reduction of
poverty in developing countries, with consequent emphasis on
income distribution, employment, technology and rural develop-
ment. This neglect also applies to the work of international organiza-
tions (with the exception of UNCTAD) which have tended to treat
employment policies, income distribution policies, technology
policies etc. as the internal matters of developing countries.
This is at odds both with recent theoretical developments which tend
to emphasize the influence of the global system and global relations
on the internal structures of developing countries, and also with
empirical findings about the impact of changes in trade relations
upon the employment situation in developing countries. Thus it has
been estimated' that the decline in the share of developing countries
in world trade between 1955 and 1970 has cost the developing
countries 72 million jobs, or no less than 14.5 per cent of their 1970
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labour force. Similar estimates related more specifically to agricul-
tural exports have been made by the FAO and the World Bank, and
although couched in terms of GNP they enable us to infer the great
potential gain in employment which developing countries could
enjoy as a result of liberalized imports of agricultural and agriculture-
based products by the richer countries. Leaving aside the oil
exporters, the volume of exports of developing countries during the
period 1961 to 1972 has increased by less than 5½ per cent per
annum, at just about the same rate as GNP, in spite of the enormous
and unparalleled expansion of world trade. Contrary to the situation
in developed countries, exports cannot therefore act as a spearhead
of employment creation; while, because of unfavourable terms of
trade and rising debt burdens from past investment and aid, import
capacity remains so restricted as to impose tight limits to possible
employment expansion. Yet employment creation has increasingly
emerged as a chief instrument of reducing poverty, since the majority
of those below the poverty line in developing countries are able.
bodied persons of working age, or their dependents.
At the IDS, a start has been made in analysing trade liberalization in
relation to employment and income distribution rather than
economic growth in general.2 Whilst still somewhat provisional, this
has already resulted in a number of clarifications and the collection
of useful data. This first analysis was undertaken in the context of
the idea of unilateral, non-reciprocal trade concessions which
dominated the first approach towards the coming GATT negotia-
tions, preceding the oil crisis and related upheavals. In any future
work the emphasis would have to be much more on balanced trade
expansion rather than unilateral trade 'liberalization'. While this
would lend a different flavour to the analysis, the essential impact of
increased export production, and/or better prices for exports, on
employment and income distribution would remain substantially the
same.
A conceptual framework for analysing employment effects of
additional exports is more or less shared by most analysts. There is
2H.W. Singer et al., Trade Liberalization, Employment and Income Distríbution:
a first approach, IDS Discussion Paper no. 31.
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the direct employment provided by increasing export volumes; this
may be zero if the initial expansion or liberalization is entirely in
terms of higher prices obtained for exports (i.e. export earnings),
perhaps as a result of commodity agreements, rather than improved
access for additional exports. Then there is the indirect or linkage
effect which can be sub-divided into backward linkage (additional
domestically produced inputs) and forward linkage. For instance, if
more shoes are exported there will be additional inputs of leather
and, going further back, cattle hides, domestically produced equip-
ment, glue, tanning materials, shoe laces etc. (backward linkage). The
shoe exports will also lead to additional employment in transporting,
shipping, insuring, trading (forward linkage). In calculating linkage
effects it is important to avoid double-counting. If the export of
shoes takes the place of previous exports of leather, there will still be
a positive employment effect through the additional processing, and
the value added. But it would be fallacious to add to this the
employment created by the production of leather as being due to the
export of shoes, since shoe exports take the place of leather exports.
Besides the direct and indirect (linkage) employment effects, we can
distinguish the multiplier effects arising from the expenditure of the
additional incomes earned through expanded direct and indirect
employment. Increased export earnings due to higher prices would
have employment multiplier effects in the same way as increased
export volumes, although the two effects are not necessarily
identical. The calculation of multiplier employment and income
effects again requires specific analysis of all actual benefits from the
higher incomes obtained by the direct and indirect producers of the
additional exports; the distribution of the increased incomes through-
out the different stages of the producing and distributing chain
would be of crucial importance, as well as distribution between
national producers and foreign investors; empirical analysis of this is
often difficult.
Finally, there is the very important neo-classical type of balance-of-
payments employment effect; this is the expansion of employment
and creation of additional incomes made possible by the removal or
relaxation of the foreign exchange bottleneck due to higher export
earnings. Here again it is important to avoid double-counting; to the
7
extent that the original increase in exports requires additional
imported inputs, or to the extent that the multiplier effects of
additional incomes generated involve additional imports, the foreign
exchange bottleneck is not eased, and no additional investment for
employment creation is possible. In other cases, the additional
investment may be needed to cope with supply constraints and
capacity limitations arising directly from the expansion of exports
and related production of required inputs. However, in many specific
situations increased exports will make possible the import of
additional capital equipment which would complement the available
labour supply in new lines of production, increasing employment and
reducing poverty.
Thus there are four headings under which the employment effect of
additional exports can be analysed: direct, indirect, multiplier, and
balance of payments. Ñot enough empirical or measurement work
has been done for us to say very much about the relationship
between these four types of additional employment, except that in
most situations direct employment creation will be only a minor part
of the total employment effect. Hence it would be misleading to try
to deduce the impact on income distribution and on poverty from
the direct employment effect only.
The report of the Philippines ILO Employment Mission3 contains
some data4 which would indicate that the linkage employment
effects alone were over three times the direct employment effects in
the case of traditional consumption goods; over ten times in the case
of export oriented manufacturing; over two-and-a-half times in the
case of modern intermediate goods; and also over two-and-a-half
times in the case of modern capital goods. However, this calculation
when applied to the employment effect of additional exports may
include elements of double-counting of the kind discussed above, in
so far as it assumes that the exports of the various classes of goods
analysed are entirely additional and are not replacing exports of less
3Sharing in Development: A Programme of Employment, Equity and Growth
for the Philippines, ILO Geneva, 1974.
4Special Paper no. 19: 'Intersectoral linkages and direct and indirect employ-
ment effects'.
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manufactured or primary products. In the case of agricultural
products where the backward linkages are so much less, the
difference between direct and indirect employment effects is of
course narrowed. But even so it is worth noting that the total (direct
and linkage employment effects) is still much greater for agricultural
products than for manufactured products or construction activities.
Even export crops provide twice the volume of employment for a
given value of exports than manufacturing, the domestic food crops
twice as much again as export crops. Within the manufacturing sector,
export-oriented manufacturing goods create almost twice as much
employment as modern capital goods or intermediate goods, and
traditional consumption goods create three times as much as export-
oriented manufactures.5 Total net (domestic) linkages for agriculture
were 50-100 per cent higher than for most industries in the case of
India; and 100-500 per cent higher in the case of East Pakistan
(Bangladesh) and West Pakistan (Pakistan).6
Apart from the greater employment and presumably also income
distribution effects of agricultural exports, the other fact which
stands out clearly from these and other data is the greater employ-
ment effect of traditional types of goods, and of export-oriented
types of production. This leads to two conclusions:
the importance of sectoral or commodity selectivity in pro-
moting exports designed for maximum impact on employment
and income distribution; and
the fact that the natural export products of developing countries
(primary, processed and labour-intensive products) tend to be
more employment-intensive than modern sector production for
the home market, especially under conditions of protection and
factor price distortion.
This is not a novel observation and has in fact been extensively dealt
with in economic literature.7 Empirical data are less frequent, but
5A1 data drawn from Philippine Employment Mission, op. cit.
6S.N. Acharya and B.R. Hazari, 'Linkages and Imports: a comparative study of
India and Pakistan',Journal of Development Studies, October 1971.
7e.g.(i)Little, Scitovsky and Scott: Industry and Trade in Some Developing
Countries, for OECD Development Centre, 1970.
(ii)ibid: Employment, Incomes and Equality. A strategy for increasing pro-
ductive employment in Kenya. ILO Geneva, 1972.
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for Turkey, for example, it has been estimated that output per unit
of investment was 3.4 times higher, valued at international prices for
export industries, than for import-substituting industries.8 This
would have meant not only more direct and linkage employment
(presumably at least 3.4 times as much), but also an increased import
capacity 3.4 times larger than that set free by import substitution,
and a correspondingly enhanced potential balance of payments
employment effect. Recent studies in the field of manufacture have
shown quite conclusively that the pattern of exports from developing
countries is strongly concentrated at the labour-intensive end of
manufactured products, in line with the Heckscher-Ohlin factor
proportions theory.9
This link between the degree of trade liberalization or freedom of
access to markets on the part of the developing countries and the
nature of their overall technology deserves special emphasis. Freer
trade is the means by which the developing countries can bring into
play their abundant labour supplies as well as their natural resources,
and therefore trade expansion tends to be equivalent to a shift in
technology in the direction of greater labour intensity. The labour
intensity of production is not only determined by the technology of
producing given products, but also, very importantly, by the output
mix. Additional trade will give added importance to labour-intensive
products in the total output mix. It ill behoves richer countries to
preach to developing countries the virtues of labour-intensive or
intermediate technology, while at the same time through trade
restrictions denying them one of the most important and obvious
ways of employing such a technology.
In the same direction, it has been pointed out in the ILO employ-
ment missions, especially the one for i° and confirmed by
8A.O. Krueger: 'Some Economic Costs of Exchange Control: the Turkish case',
Journal of Political Economy, October 1966.
9See, for instance: A.H.M. Mahfuzur Rahman, Exports of Manufactures from
Developing Countries, Centre for Development Planning, Rotterdam; Rotterdam
University Press, 1973.
10 Towards Full Employment. A Programme for Colombia, ILO Geneva, 1970.
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subsequent analysis,11 that increased labour intensity initially in-
duced by trade expansion will in turn have a multiplier effect in
generating further labour-intensive employment and hence more
equal income distribution in several senses:
the demand pattern of lower income groups tends to be for more
labour-intensive products, so that the employment multiplier
effect tends to be positively correlated with the initial employ-
ment effect; the higher the initial employment, the higher also
the former;
the linkages of the products consumed by lower income groups
tend to be more labour-intensive and hence the linkage effect
also tends to be positively correlated with the direct employment
effect;
the import content of both direct linkage and multiplier employ-
ment from products produced by lower income groups is less
than for products consumed by higher income groups, and this
would tend to increase the domestic employment impact as well
as the balance of payments effect of such additional initial
employment.'2
An interesting corollary of this is that trade expansion tends to result
in a more equal income distribution in developing countries by
enhancing the share of labour as against capital; while in the
developed countries - at least as far as trade with the developing
countries is concerned - it will have the opposite effect, resulting in
a more unequal income distribution. This to some extent explains
the political resistance in developed countries to more liberal imports
from the developing countries, at least in the absence of redistribu-
tive social policies or effective compensation and adjustment pro-
cedures.'3
11 Felix Paukert et al., Redistribution of Income Patterns of Consumption and
Employment - A Case Study for the Philippines, working paper prepared for
ILO World Employment Research Programme, Geneva, May 1974.
12 It should be pointed out, however, that this last element was not confirmed in
the Philippines case by Felix Paukert et al., op. cit.
13 This has also been pointed out by Michael Lipton, see 'Confrontation Versus
Co-operation: Poor Countries' Dwindling External Options; Bargaining; and the
Case for Multiple Bilateralism' in IDS Bulletin special issue 'Oil and Develop-
ment', vol. 6 no. 2, October 1974.
The study undertaken at the 1DS14 has also brought out very clearly
how the specific approaches to trade liberalization, such as par-
ticularly, the 'Kennedy Round' of GATT negotiations and the, EEC
Preference Scheme (GSP),15 have been almost systematically
weighted against the poorer countries and against those commodities
and processing margins that are of particular value for employment
creation and hence reduction of poverty in developing countries.
Both tariff and non-tariff barriers tend to weigh more heavily against
products from developing countries - e.g. in 1969, 11 per cent of all
imports of developed countries were subject to non-tariff barriers
compared with 28.2 per cent of their imports from developing
countries. 16 In this sense trade policy has been at cross purposes
with the professed aims of aid policy and development policy in
general. The question therefore arises of how a future policy of trade
liberalization, or perhaps more realistically, a future policy of
balanced trade expansion with the oil deficit countries of the Third
World, can be geared more effectively and more purposefully to a
direct attack on poverty and unemployment in the Third World.
Here again, the IDS 'first approach' study has brought out a number
of points both of method and of substance on which relatively little
research has been done and on which it is desirable also to obtain
more empirical data.
The principle which obviously suggests itself is that of 'country
selectivity'. Trade concessions should be concentrated on those
countries where they are most likely to result in increased employ-
ment and increased incomes for people below the poverty line. Two
14 IDS Discussion Paper no. 31, op. cit.
The EEC Preference Scheme is presently due to be significantly improved,
especially by including processed agricultural products, liberalizing the level of
ceilings under GSP preference, drastically reducing the number of sensitive
products where the EEC reserves the right of cancellation of preference, and a
modification of the rules of origin which will remove the present bias against
regional co-operation among developing countries. These are very significant
improvements as far as developing countries as a whole are concerned, but it is
not clear at this moment whether they would significantly affect the bias within
the scheme against poorest countries and against poor producers. The most
significant improvement from that point of view would seem to be the extension
of the scheme to processed agricultural products.
16 UN Economic and Social Council, Project IV, p. 13.
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questions immediately arise once the principle is stated in this
general form. First, how can country selectivity be reconciled with
traditional methods of trade negotiations? The general principle of
trade negotiations is precisely to rule out country selectivity, which
is assumed to introduce an undesirable 'political' element into the
'neutral' procedure of peaceful trade expansion, and to be incom-
patible with the ideal of global freeing of trade. This 'neutral' or
'non-political' character of trade concessions and trade liberalization,
however, has already been heavily diluted by such factors as regional
integration, preferential schemes such as EEC relations with
associates and the EEC 'hierarchy' as opposed to a global policy, by
the introduction of the concept of 'least developed countries' for
which special trade concessions might be permissible, as well as by
the general introduction of the concept of non-reciprocity in Part IV
of the GATT Rules. It is quite possible that in future this dilution
will be further increased through the spread of bilateral arrangements
for balanced trade expansion between countries with oil-induced
balance of payments deficits. 17 But even so, there remains a conflict
between country selectivity and the prevailing principles of trade
negotiations, as most clearly embodied in the Most Favoured Nation
clause and also in the concept of the 'principal supplier' governing
trade negotiations.'8
Second, how should the principle of country selectivity be applied,
provided it is agreed and can be reconciled with existing procedures?
Clearly, it could be applied in two different ways:
specific efforts could be made to expand the exports of the
poorest countries, on the assumption that the poorer the benefit-
ing country the more likely it will be that the beneficiaries will
also be poor; or
an attempt could be made to select countries which, although
not necessarily poorer than others within the Third World
category, have the most effective policies for shifting resources,
including those resulting from trade expansion, towards the
poorer sections of their population.
' Michael Lipton, op. cit.
18 IDS Discussion Paper no. 31, op. cit.
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Again, once these two possibilities are stated a number of obvious
problems arise. Taking (a) first (the concentration of benefits on
poor countries), the first question is where to draw the line in
identifying the main beneficiaries of such a policy. The problems
involved have already been acutely felt in connection with the UN
list of least developed countries which, for largely irrelevant reasons,
leaves out some of the largest and poorest countries such as India and
Bangladesh. A related problem is that of the criteria to be used to
establish such a list; in the case of the UN list three criteria were
used:
per capita GNP;
illiteracy rate;
share of manufacturing production in GNP.
Other criteria and combinations of criteria are equally plausible.
But perhaps the most important doubt is whether tjie basic assump-
tion is justified, i.e., that benefits shifted to poorer countries will also
ensure that the benefits go to poorer people. It is understandable
that the UN, which is based on the principle that governments
represent the interests of their people, should make this identifica-
tion. But it does not follow that this is realistic or that developed
countries in contemplating their national trade policies would be
willing to make the same assumption. (An obvious example would be
trade concessions made to Haiti, which is on the UN list of
least-developed countries). But although data to support a firm
conclusion are not available, it is plausible to assume that the poorer
developing countries have also a more unequal income distribution,
perhaps for similar reasons to those which explain why the develop-
ing countries as a whole have a more unequal income distribution
than the developed countries as a whole. This might not apply to the
very poorest countries, because where the total volume of resources
is so small, the poorer people of those countries could not con-
ceivably be alive today if the income distribution did not have a
certain degree of equality, particularly as regards the poorest 20 per
cent of the population. But be that as it may, the problem remains
that additional resources shifted to the poorer or poorest countries
through trade expansion might well benefit the richer groups within
those countries, or foreign investors operating in them, or export and
import traders of the developed countries controlling their trade. All
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this will depend on the specific situation, policies and power
structure within each of these countries. The principle of fungibility
must be assumed to apply, i.e., even if the direct and immediate
benefits from the additional trade accrue to the poorest producers
within the benefiting poorer countries, if the general policies of the
country are such as to shift resources in the direction of richer
groups or foreign investors, this will determine the ultimate impact
of expanded trade.
This is the principal argument for adopting the second course, i.e.
selecting those countries for trade expansion which from their
general structure and policies can be assumed to shift any additional
benefits to the poorer sections of their people. This approach is
strengthened by the importance given in the discussion above to
linkage employment, multiplier employment and balance-of-
payments employment effects as against the direct employment
impact of producing the additional exports. For the extent and
nature of these indirect effects depend very much upon internal
policies and internal structures. But the obvious difficulty is how to
separate the sheep from the goats - how to identify those countries
with a 'good' income distribution policy from those with a 'bad' one.
This will involve difficult decisions which may go against the grain of
the political interests of the major trading countries, the more so
since such decisions must remain to some extent arbitrary and a
matter of judgment, and for which in any case at the present time
the necessary data are largely lacking, owing to the obsession of
statisticians with aggregate production and GNP figures.
What criteria could be used to distinguish 'good' from 'bad'
countries? The possibilities seem to be, present equality of income
distribution (provided we had the necessary data); rates of employ-
ment and unemployment (for which we have practically no com-
parable data at all, in spite of the efforts of the ILO World
Employment Programme); the percentage of the population below
the poverty line (although that depends to some extent on the level
of average incomes and on the existence of comparable poverty lines).
But is there any guarantee that countries which in the past have had
'good' policies will continue to do so in the future, or vice versa? In
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practice it would seem best to link trade concessions with leverage by
the main trading countries to induce countries to move to a 'better'
policy - but will such leverage not be an intolerable interference
with the domestic affairs of developing countries and how in practice
should such leverage be designed and implemented?
We may also consider that the country unit is somewhat arbitrary
and misleading in measuring average income levels. For example,
while Brazil would clearly not qualify for special priority on any
principle of country selectivity, the north-east contains people whose
average income is extremely low and should qualify for priority
concessions (and their actual number is larger than that of most
developing countries). This would suggest a policy, in trade
negotiations, of singling out the export products of such very poor
regions within richer countries (for instance, for Brazil the con-
cessions would be made on export products other than coffee, which
comes from the richer south). There is certainly scope for such a
procedure, although it is subject both to the objection of inter-
ference in internal affairs, and to the tremendous administrative
complication of trade negotiations which would result. Moreover,
there is always the fungibility objection: a country with 'bad'
policies will always find ways and means of diverting benefits away
from poor regions to the richer regions. Finally, there is the
objection that a poor region within a richer country should be
looked after by the rest of the country, and not have to rely on the
international community for special equalizing trade concessions.
The other possible approach is based on commodity selectivity, in
place of (or in combination with) country selectivity. A list could be
drawn up in which commodities were ranked either according to the
degree to which they were produced by poorer people, or the degree
to which they are employment-intensive, or a combination of the
two.
The trouble with this approach is that the income level of the
producers as well as the employment intensity of production depend
strongly upon the mode of production. In the case of agricultural
products, for instance, the employment intensity of production
would normally be high and the income level of the beneficiary
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would normally be low in the case of production on small farms and
vice versa for production on large estates or plantations. Participation
in export production, and specifically response to new export
possibilities, may often be concentrated on the larger estates so that
the benefits would not accrue in conformity with employment!
income distribution criteria, even though the bulk of the present or
domestic production of the commodity concerned might correspond
to such criteria. Possibly the best application of the principle of
commodity selectivity is by sectors: there is convincing evidence that
agricultural products in general have a higher employment intensity
and that the rural producer tends to be poorer than the urban
producer, so that expanded trade in agricultural products is most
likely to satisfy the distributive criteria. The same would apply to the
processing of agricultural products, particularly when this is done on
a small scale and in rural locations.
In trying to channel the benefits of expanded trade to the poorer
countries, to poorer producers and to particularly labour-intensive
commodities, the proposal has also emerged 19 to allocate free floor
quotas to the poorer among the developing countries, or to new
exporters not previously listed among the 'principal suppliers', or
specifically for commodities which study has shown to be specially
important for rural development or specially labour-intensive or
specially associated with poor producers (e.g. handicraft products). It
is also clear that the poorer countries, poorer producers and new
exporters also are in particular need of special long-term guarantees
and actual help in setting up and developing export industries. Once
we take seriously the idea of trade as a tool in the fight against
poverty, it is clear that trade promotion for the benefit of developing
countries must go far beyond trade concessions. A further offshoot
of this line of thinking is the idea that adjustment assistance must be
available not only to workers and producers in developed countries
who might otherwise offer resistance to more liberal imports from
poorer countries, but also to developing countries, in two forms:
(a) adjustment assistance for the import-substituting industries
which have been built up on the basis of protection and distorted
19 Originally developed by Angus Hone, one of the collaborators in IDS
Discussion Paper no. 31, op. cit.
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factor prices, and which might suffer even in a controlled
transition towards an export orientation. Care would obviously
have to be taken that such payments did not benefit foreign
investors and national producers who have made good profits on
the basis of past protection and inducements, and can well afford
to carry the cost of transition themselves. Also, such payments
must not be allowed to become a subsidy for continued existence
rather than for a smoothed transition.
(b) the very export industries that would be built up on the basis of
better market access offered by the rich countries need pro-
tection against sudden and unforeseen disruption suffered when
the rich countries, for reasons of national policy, suddenly
invoke escape clauses or restrict access after initially offering it to
developing countries. This is an aspect of adjustment assistance
which deserves further exploration. 20
20 A first study of this is now proceeding at the IDS within the framework of an
OECD reseaich project on adjustment assistance problems.
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